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ABSTRACT
The rise across Europe of political parties espousing an ethnic
conception of the nation, explicitly opposed to immigrants and
minorities, has brought into stark relief the politics of identity.
Exploiting multiple identity questions in a large, nationally
representative UK survey, this paper investigates the drivers of
ethnic and political identity and the extent to which they are
similar. It does so for both the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities.
Locating our analysis within social identity theory, we consider the
role of observed characteristics, including party aﬃliation, the
experience of harassment, and political context in shaping ethnic
and political identities. We also show that there are unobserved
factors jointly implicated in individuals’ political and ethnic
identities, which we interpret as providing suggestive evidence of
more general political mobilisation of ethnicity. Although individual
characteristics have largely expected associations with identity, we
ﬁnd that the local share of UKIP/BNP voters heightens ethnic but
not political identity among both majority and minority
populations. By contrast, harassment and discrimination shapes
minorities’ political but not ethnic identity. Contrary to expectations,
both political and ethnic identities are stronger among second-
generation compared to immigrant minorities.
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Introduction
The rise across Europe of political parties espousing an ethnic conception of the nation,
explicitly opposed to the immigrants and minorities and their claims to belonging, has
brought into stark relief the politics of identity (Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009;
Hopkins 2010; Huddy 2001). In parallel, concerns with the failures of multiculturalism
and integration have problematised the extent to which minorities identify with their
ethnic ‘origins’ rather than with national values (Koopmans 2013; Cameron 2011; Rees-
kens and Wright 2013). Theory and existing literature posits that such currents might
be expected to inﬂuence the majority population’s social identities (Tajfel and Turner
1986; Deaux et al. 1995), as they respond politically to the explicit mobilisation of narratives
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of ethnic identity (Kenny 2014). Note that by political identity, we refer to the salience of
politics to an individual’s sense of self, rather than partisanship. These contemporary
developments would also be expected to shape the ethnic and political identity of min-
orities, as the salience of minority status is heightened and politicised by such narratives.
Extant research has demonstrated the importance of political orientation and ethno-
national identity for majority group behaviours, such as party membership or voting
‘Leave’ in the recent UK referendum (e.g. Henderson et al. 2017). Political engagement
has also been linked to ethnicity and to minority group experiences (Sanders et al.
2014). There is also some evidence that those with particular political partisanship have
stronger ethnic identities (Nandi and Platt 2015). However, existing analysis has not so
far identiﬁed whether the drivers of stronger political identity are also the drivers of stron-
ger ethnic identity. That is, whether ethnic and political identities are co-determined. This
is our contribution.
We locate our analysis in social identity theory that highlights the potential for multiple
identities to co-exist and for speciﬁc identities to be triggered in varied social contexts
(Abrams 2010; Jenkins 2014; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Abrams and Hogg
1999). Rather than addressing whether stronger political identity leads to stronger
ethnic identity (or vice versa), we pose the prior question of what factors are shaping
these identities. While we know an increasing amount about the correlates of ethnic iden-
tity and the factors associated with political partisanship or behaviours, we know much
less about characteristics and context shaping people’s sense of the relevance of politics
to their identity (‘political identity’). Nor do we know whether the factors are similar
across the two identities. Our initial aim is therefore exploratory. We examine whether
those individual and local-contextual factors associated with an increased ethnic sensi-
tivity also stimulate enhanced political identity, across majority and minority populations.
Many of the key triggers of ethnic and political identity that are theoretically relevant
and have been postulated as underpinning the relationship between the two, such as pol-
itical mobilisation by political parties and politicised discourses around ethnicity, cannot
be directly observed or measured quantitatively. That is, we cannot, by deﬁnition, dis-
tinguish the inﬂuence of common discourses and traits. We argue that, theoretically, if
these are important then they will be revealed through unobserved factors inﬂuencing
both ethnic and political identity concurrently. We, therefore, evaluate whether
common unobserved factors also contribute to the strength of individuals’ ethnic and pol-
itical identity, net of the observed characteristics.
The importance of our study lies in the insights it oﬀers on the formation of ethnic and
political identity. In the context of multiple claims relating to identities, ethno-national
orientations and the politics of immigration, we are able to test propositions stemming
from these claims. In the highly charged atmosphere that has marked political discussions
of minority status and the re-emergence of populist nationalism with a strong ethnic
undertow, the question of the interconnectedness between political and ethnic identities
of a country’s minority and majority populations is timely. More generally, as both
local and national elections in many European countries and beyond are increasingly
being fought on the grounds of ethno-national identities and the othering of minorities
and migrants, it is critical to ascertain the success of these strategies.
We address these questions exploiting a set of multiple-domain identity questions in a
large, nationally representative multi-topic panel survey, Understanding Society (Knies
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2017). We estimate seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models to enable us to identify
individual-level factors associated with political and ethnic identity and also unobserved
factors inﬂuencing both identities not captured by, and not working through, this exten-
sive suite of individual-level measures. We estimate separate models for majorities and
minorities. We focus on the minority–majority distinction since our argument is based
on the dichotomy between majority vs. minority status itself.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, drawing on indications from existing literature we
derive expected associations between individual characteristics and ethnic and political
identity and explore how far these are evidenced in our data. We show that individual
and contextual factors are associated with ethnic and political identity in largely expected
directions. We therefore amplify existing understanding of the formation of identities.
Second, we are able to show that common unobserved factors are implicated in both
ethnic and political identities. By purging our identity measures of idiosyncratic variations
and controlling for a range of relevant individual-level characteristics, we can more plau-
sibly argue that common drivers of ethnic and political identities represent the broader
political mobilisation of ethnicity. We further argue that if political identity is enhanced
through mobilisation of ethnic identity (or vice versa) we would expect these common
unobserved drivers to be stronger among majorities compared to minorities since there
is greater scope for triggering ethnic identity among the typically normalised majority.
We also expect this more among majority group members more to the right of the political
spectrum, who are more likely to have endorsed ethnic notions of nation. Since we ﬁnd
these patterns, we argue they represent prima facie empirical evidence for political mobil-
isation of ethnicity.
Third, focusing on minorities we examine whether minorities’ political and ethnic iden-
tities are sensitive to experiences of harassment. Given visible minority status – and hence
ethnic ascription and identiﬁcation – can be expected to be salient even without personal
experience of harassment, we anticipate negative experiences may play out in heightened
political rather than ethnic identity. Finding this relationship, we suggest that the proble-
matisation of minority ethnic identiﬁcation in political discourse (e.g. Cameron 2011;
DHCLG 2018) may miss the ways in which alienation or mobilisation is actually
expressed.
Next, we elaborate on the theoretical framework and literature and outline the expec-
tations we derive from it. In the subsequent sections, we describe the data and methods,
our main results, and discuss the implications of our ﬁndings and conclude.
Background and theory
Social identities
Our starting point is social identity theory (Abrams 2010; Jenkins 2014; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel
and Turner 1986; Abrams and Hogg 1999), which posits that individuals hold personal
and social identities that provide points of diﬀerentiation from other individuals or
from other social groups (Oaks, Turner and Haslam 1991). Social identities are formed
and expressed under speciﬁc historical, cultural and ideological conditions, and ‘matter’
for social relations (Tajfel 1974), for individual development (Phinney 1992), and for
national cohesion and coherence (Reeskens and Wright 2013). Social identity theory
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posits that a speciﬁc identiﬁcation presupposes categorisation of others – which can have
implications for their experiences, resources and, status (Jenkins 2014).
Deaux et al. (1995) have argued that social identity theory is most applicable to ethnic
as well as religious and political identity. However, studies of minority ethnic identity often
continue to imply that ethnic identity is the sole relevant aspect of identity, and neglect
other forms of identiﬁcation, such as political, or for that matter, gender, class or occu-
pational identity (Nandi and Platt 2012). Conversely, studies of the ethnic majority are
only gradually recognising the relevance of their ethnic identity (Kenny 2014; Henderson
et al. 2017). As a result, despite the emphasis in social identity theory on multiple identities
(Abrams 2010; Jenkins 2014) and the strong theoretical basis for the co-evolution of ethnic
and political identities, discussed below, we lack empirical evidence on other identity
domains and their relationship to ethnic identity. Given that identiﬁcation is an expression
of ‘interest’ (Jenkins 2014) that has implications for others through processes of inclusion
and exclusion (Tajfel and Turner 1986), the relationship between political identity (with
its implication for claims to the public sphere) and ethnic identity (with the potential
for polarisation) merits consideration.
Minority ethnic and political identities
In the context of increasing minority ethnic populations in Europe, there have been vivid
debates on multiculturalism, acculturation and assimilation both within the academic
sphere and the political arena (e.g. Koopmans 2013; Modood 2007; Brubaker 2001).
The political discourse has linked failures of ‘integration’ to minority ethnic groups’
retention of their ethnic identity and failure to engage with national identity (e.g.
Cameron 2011; DHCLG 2018). As a consequence, extensive academic analyses have
aimed to assess such claims. This literature has explored the extent, correlates and conse-
quences of ethnic and national identiﬁcation of ethnic minorities from both immigrant
and second generations (Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann 2009; Manning and
Roy 2010; Platt 2014; Van Heelsum and Koomen 2016; Platt 2014; Nandi and Platt
2015; Nguyen and Benet-Martínez 2013; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Karlsen and Nazroo
2013). This literature has demonstrated that ethnic identities tend to decline across gen-
erations, though still remaining strong into the second generation, while national identity
increases. It has also illustrated a range of characteristics associated with ethnic identity,
including age, gender, educational qualiﬁcations, occupation, region of residence, and pol-
itical aﬃliation.
There is substantial evidence that minority identities are associated with forms of pol-
itical engagement or behaviours. For example, Martinovic and Verkuyten (2014) suggest
that dual ethnic-national identity reduces political engagement while both Simon and
Grabow (2010) and Fischer-Neumann (2014) ﬁnd the opposite. Sanders et al. (2014)
show that both ethnic embeddedness and majority acculturation are associated with
greater political engagement among minorities. Naturalisation, which can be understood
as aﬀective investment in destination countries has also been linked, though not consist-
ently, to political engagement of minorities (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono
2015; Street 2017).
The literature has also drawn attention to the role of political discourse and local
context in shaping (dual) identity expression (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Nandi and
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Platt 2016; Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016). Simon and Grabow (2010) for
example highlight the politicised nature of minority ethnic identity. Research also suggests
that those contexts which foster ethnic identity and belonging can also mobilise min-
orities’ political consciousness (Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Sanders et al. 2014; Sobolewska
et al. 2015; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015).
We might, therefore, expect minorities’ recognition of their ethnicity as salient (‘ethnic
social identity’) to go hand in hand with recognition of politics as an important identity
domain (‘political social identity’). However, we lack empirical evidence on whether
this is the case.
Majority ethnic and political identities
Majority ethnic identities, by contrast, have often in the past been normalised or neglected
in studies of ethnic identity, with ethnicity being seen to be the preserve of minorities
(Fenton and Mann 2011). However, a burgeoning body of research now explicitly inter-
rogates majority or native populations’ ethnic identity. This literature suggests that
ethnic identiﬁcation among the majority is weaker than among minorities, but is also
more contextually speciﬁc (Nandi and Platt 2015, 2016). That is, it comes into relief
under speciﬁc local, temporal and political conditions (Kenny 2014). Contemporary
English identity expression has been linked to a speciﬁc ‘sense of the nation’ (Bond
2017; Leddy-Owen 2014; Kumar 2003); and across Europe, we see that national identities
are being reconceived. Instead of civic constructions of nationhood (Smith 1991), the
ethnic roots of national identities (Wimmer and Glick Shiller 2003) appear to be
ﬁnding increasing expression within the associated movements in countries such as
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, The Netherlands and the UK,
with corresponding implications for cohesion and solidarity (Reeskens and Wright
2013) and anti-immigrant prejudice (Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009). Huntington’s
(1993) claims about cultural clash have found resonance in the political retreat frommulti-
culturalism (Koopmans 2013); and public attitudes have shown a belief in the incompat-
ibility of shared identities in multicultural societies (e.g. Duﬀy and Frere-Smith 2014).
In the UK, political parties have aimed to mobilise such ethnic nationalism by linking
ethnic and political identity explicitly among majority (white) populations (Wyn Jones
et al. 2012; Bechhofer and McCrone 2014; Bond 2017; Henderson et al. 2017). The rise
of the anti-immigration UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the years up to 2016 was
implicated in a particular construction of national identity, linked to nostalgia for an ima-
gined past of traditional values and certainties, which invoked speciﬁc cultural under-
standings of Englishness (Kumar 2003). Such strategies appeared to pay oﬀ in electoral
terms, with Englishness clearly implicated in the recent ‘Brexit’ vote (Henderson et al.
2017); and awareness of ethnic identity among majority (white) populations has been
associated with particular forms of political consciousness, but there is very little empirical
evidence of this co-evolution. Indeed, existing research suggests that there is no simple
relationship between white majorities’ sense of the salience of their ethnicity (and anti-
immigrant sentiment) and their political mobilisation (e.g. Thomas et al. 2018; Duﬀy
and Frere-Smith 2014). Rather, political commitment and ethnic orientation vary in
complex ways (Kenny 2014). It therefore remains open to investigation whether similar
factors are implicated in majority ethnic and political identities
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Our study
Building on the previous discussion, rather than interrogating ethnic identity as the driver
of political orientation or behaviour (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Martinovic and Verkuyten
2014), our aim in this study is to investigate the extent to which drivers are common across
political and ethnic identity for both the majority and minorities. We posit that there will
be individual and contextual inﬂuences on these identities, which are susceptible to
measurement. We also posit that there are factors representing the political climate and
ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant discourses, which are unobservable at the individual
level. From existing research, we can derive expectations about how these observed and
unobserved factors might shape identities.
Individual-level inﬂuences on ethnic and political identity
If political identity is associated with political engagement, we might expect factors
inﬂuencing political identity to be comparable for minorities and majority, as has
been shown for political engagement in earlier research (Sanders et al. 2014; Heath
et al. 2013). For ethnic identity, we might expect there to be more relevant individual-
level inﬂuences among the majority, since ethnic identity has been shown to be less sus-
ceptible to variation in characteristics among minorities (Nandi and Platt 2015). Gender
is an exception. Being a woman is typically associated expected with weaker political
engagement (Kittilson 2016), and we expect it to be associated with weaker political
identity for both majority and minorities; but among minorities it is expected to be
associated with stronger ethnic identity, as women are regarded as the ‘bearers of
culture’ (Winter 2016) and appear to be more sensitised to minority ethnic ‘markers’
(Warikoo 2005).
Education has been negatively linked to ethnic identity and positively linked to political
identity / political engagement (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Strand 2014; Nandi and Platt
2015), since educational attainment provides an alternative and valued source of identity
for minorities, and increases awareness of and engagement with politics across the board.
We expect political party support to be linked to greater political identity. We anticipate
that right-wing political aﬃliation, as well as that within the devolved administrations of
the UK, will be associated with stronger ethnic identity among the majority; and more left-
wing political aﬃliation associated with stronger ethnic identity among minorities, given
the ways in which left-wing parties tend to more explicitly espouse issues of diversity and
minority rights (see discussion in Martin and Mellon 2018).
Finally, some characteristics are more likely to aﬀect identity among minorities. Much
of the ethnic identity literature reﬂects the particular salience of Islam within political dis-
course and as a marker of identity (Van Heelsum and Koomen 2016; Zolberg and Woon
1999; Cameron 2011; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013). Given this and the politisisation of
Muslims within the public sphere (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Diehl, Fischer-Neumann,
and Mühlau 2016), we would expect Muslim religious aﬃliation to be associated with
greater political identity among minorities, particularly among the second generation
(Just, Sandovici, and Listhaug 2014). Harassment on ethnic or racial grounds brings
ethnic boundaries and outgroup membership into sharp relief. We would thus expect it
to be associated with both greater ethnic and political identity, as identiﬁed by Simon
and Grabow (2010).
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Despite Rumbaut’s (1997) claims for reactive ethnicity, existing research suggests that
minorities’ ethnic identity declines across generations (Platt 2014; Van Heelsum and
Koomen 2016) or becomes more transnational in orientation (Muttarak 2014; Jacobson
1997). The second generation can be expected to have a greater understanding of the pol-
itical system and may be more attuned to political messages and the sensitivity to politics
that comes from a greater awareness of inequities (Platt 2014; Heath and Demireva 2014).
At the same time, Heath et al. (2013) point to ‘assimilation’ to a relatively low level of
engagement among (young) minorities across generations. Martin and Mellon (2018)
show however a rather large degree of political partisanship among minority youth. On
balance, we expect the second generation to have lower ethnic identities but stronger pol-
itical identities than the immigrant generation, once we have controlled for age.
Common unobserved inﬂuences on ethnic and political identity
If the political climate and ethnic mobilisation are shaping ethnic and political identities,
we would expect common, unobserved drivers of identities to diﬀer across subpopulations
in theoretically predictable ways. Speciﬁcally, we would expect such common unobserved
inﬂuences to be greater among the majority than among minorities, and that the associ-
ation will be greater among those majority group members with more conservative / right-
wing views. We explain why.
Politicians and ‘attitude formers’ such as media outlets aim to mobilise political engage-
ment through causing other aspects of identity – and individuals’ investment in these
identities – to become salient (Wodak and Khosravinik 2013). This is a key strategy to
mobilise politically those who have a weaker political identity and low electoral partici-
pation rates. The eﬀectiveness of these strategies depends on being able to trigger an
‘ingroup’ political identity which can be opposed to an ‘outgroup’ (Tajfel and Turner
1986). Since it is normalised, majority ethnic identity is typically weaker than minority
identity (Brewer 1991; Nandi and Platt 2016), and may, therefore, be more susceptible
to being triggered in such ways. For example, in the US, ethnic ‘messaging’, linking par-
ticular understandings of ‘nation’ and ethnos, has been used in attempts to roll back the
state through linking ‘welfare’ with migration (Hopkins 2010). In the UK, invocation of a
nostalgic version of national identity has been employed to mobilise opposition to EU
membership (Kumar 2003; Wilson and Hainsworth 2012).
Minority status is arguably consistently salient in everyday interactions and remains
relatively stable across contexts (Kinket and Verkuyten 1997). While minorities’ political
identity is likely to demonstrate some sensitivity to the broader socio-political context that
also shapes majority identity, minorities’ ethnic identities can be expected to be less malle-
able and therefore the joint inﬂuence will be less. Investment in ethnic and political iden-
tities may additionally be considered to be alternatives, particularly if conﬁdence in
political systems is low or the political discourse is antagonistic (Sanders et al. 2014). Con-
versely, the second generation who have a stronger perception of discrimination (Heath
and Demireva 2014), may experience greater politicisation as their attachment to the
speciﬁc ethnicity of their parents and parents’ countries of origin declines (Platt 2014;
Jacobson 1997; Muttarak 2014).
We would also expect a stronger correlation between the unobservables driving the two
identities among majority individuals supporting nationalist parties in the devolved
administrations where nationhood, politics and ethnicity are eﬀectively merged
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(Bechhofer and McCrone 2014). If political engagement among the majority is driven by
encouraging the ethnic identiﬁcation, we would expect the correlation coeﬃcient among
white UK members with no party aﬃliations also to be high, but driven in this case by
common factors implicated in a lack of political and ethnic identiﬁcation.
Data and methods
Data and sample
We use data from Understanding Society, the UK Household Longitudinal Study, a house-
hold panel survey of a nationally representative sample of 26,000 households and an ethnic
minority boost sample of around 4000 households that started in 2009 (University of Essex
2018). All adult (16+ year old) members of the sampled household are interviewed at one-
year intervals (Knies 2017). For further information on the relevance of Understanding
Society for research on ethnicity, see Platt and Nandi (2018). Core content asked at each
wave (on family, education, employment, income and health) is supplemented by rotating
content (on identity, political behaviour, gender attitudes, the composition of social net-
works, etc.) asked at speciﬁc intervals. Adult interviews are carried out face-to-face, sup-
plemented by a self-completion questionnaire for sensitive questions. We draw on the
identity questions carried in the self-completion questionnaire ﬁelded in the second wave.
Our analysis is thus restricted to all adult respondents who completed the wave 2 self-com-
pletion, provided valid responses on relevant covariates, and were not excluded for analytical
reasons (for example white minorities, as discussed below). This provided us with an analyti-
cal sample of 27,851 individual respondents, interviewed during 2010–2011, made up of
23,324 majority and 4527 minority group members. For analysing the role of harassment
among minorities, we restricted the analysis to the 2859 minority group members who pro-
vided this information (McFall, Nandi, and Platt 2017).
Measures
Ethnic group
Ethnic group was measured with the Oﬃce for National Statistics [ONS] 2011 Census 17-
category, self-reported ethnic group question. We coded those who reported their ethnic
group as ‘white – British/ English/ Scottish/ Welsh/ Northern Irish’ and who were born
in the UK as the white UK, or the majority. Those who chose this category but were not
born in the UK were excluded, due to the diﬀerence in their histories of settlement in the
UK.The otherwhite categorieswere also excluded fromanalysis since their identity patterns
were more similar to the majority than to the other minority groups (see Figure A2 in the
Supplementarymaterials).1 All other categories were coded as (non-white) ethnicminority.
Given that we are concerned with ethnic mobilisation, polarisation around minority
status, and the construction of the majority as having ethnic claims to nationhood,
opposed to the minority ‘other’, we focus on this binary distinction.
Dependent variables: ethnic identity and political identity
Our dependent variables derive from a multi-domain identity question modelled on a vali-
dated suite of questions originally ﬁelded in the UK’s Citizenship Survey (CLG 2009).
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Respondents were asked to complete an assessment of the importance of identity across
seven domains (age, family, gender, profession, education, political beliefs and ethnic or
racial background). Questions took the form:
We’d like to know how important various things are to your sense of who you are.
Please think about the following and tick the box that indicates whether you think it is
very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to your
sense of who you are.
We combined ‘Don’t know/doesn’t apply’, with ‘not at all important’ responses.
We reverse-coded the identity questions, so that higher values represented greater sal-
ience. We then computed the mean of individual-level responses across all ﬁve domains
(age, family, gender, profession, education) other than political identity (‘your political
beliefs’) and ethnic identity (‘Your ethnic or racial background’). Figure S1 in the Sup-
plementary materials illustrates the distribution of scores for majority and minorities,
with minorities tending to identify more strongly.
We next subtracted this mean individual-level identity score from each respondent’s
political and ethnic identity scores to create ‘net’ political and ‘net’ ethnic identity
scores. These net scores purged the political and ethnic identity responses of any individ-
ual-level tendency to ‘identify’ more or less strongly and of the eﬀects of ‘satisﬁcing’ (that
is, where respondents choose the same response option on multiple-domain questions to
minimise eﬀort). If the tendency to identify or satisﬁce diﬀers across majority and min-
orities, then this could bias our conclusions about diﬀerences in the strength of ethnic
and political identity and the association between the two. Figure S2 in the Supplementary
materials, shows the distribution of these net scores across all ethnic groups. Most min-
ority groups have similar scores and diﬀer from the white UK or majority. This lends
further support to our analytical majority–minority distinction. These net identity
scores form our two dependent variables (see Figure 1 for their average values for the
majority and minority).
Explanatory variables
Sex: We coded respondent’s self-reported sex as 0 for men and 1 for women.
Educational qualiﬁcations:We used a six-category measure of highest educational qualiﬁ-
cations: university degree or higher (reference), other higher educational qualiﬁcations,
Advanced level (age 18) or equivalent, GCSE (age 16) or equivalent, other qualiﬁcations,
no qualiﬁcations.
Political orientation: In the absence of a clear left-right scale in Understanding Society, in
order to proxy the left-right wing orientation of respondents, we used political aﬃliation.
Respondents were asked what party they supported. If they supported none, they were
asked which party they were closer to. If none, they were asked if there were to be a
general election tomorrow which party they would be most likely to support. We com-
bined the responses to produce a measure of political aﬃliation where we interpreted Con-
servative as more right wing and LibDem, Green and Labour as more left wing. We
separated out regional parties, given these are linked to speciﬁc ethno-national identities
in the smaller countries of the UK.We categorised those with no political aﬃliation on any
of these measures as a separate category.2
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UKIP and BNP presence in the neighbourhood: We merged Understanding Society data
with data on the 2010 General Election results linked to the respondent’s address at the
level of the parliamentary constituency. We included the proportion of valid votes cast
for UKIP and the British National Party (BNP) in the 2010 UK General Elections, to
test the inﬂuence of these parties on ethnic and political identities.
Muslim: Respondents were asked if they had a current religion, and, if not, whether they
were brought up in a religion. We classiﬁed all those who identiﬁed Islam on either of
these questions as Muslim and all others, including no religion, as the reference group.
Generation: We coded those minorities who were born in the UK as second generation
(reference) and those born outside UK as ﬁrst generation.
Harassment: In the ﬁrst wave of the study, respondents were asked if they were (i) phys-
ically attacked in, (ii) insulted in, (iii) felt unsafe in, or (iv) avoided a series of public places,
over the past 12 months. If they answered yes they were asked the reason. From this we
ﬁrst computed a three-category variable: the respondent had neither experienced harass-
ment nor felt unsafe/avoided being in any of these places (reference); they had been phys-
ically or verbally abused in any of these places; they felt unsafe in or avoided these places.
We created a second two-category measure of whether the respondent had experienced
physical or verbal abuse because of their ethnicity, religion or nationality, or not
(reference).
Figure 1. Net political and ethnic identity of white UK or majority and ethnic minorities.
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Controls: age, current marital status, main activity status, socio-economic class (highest
within the household) and household income (ﬁve income bands based on imputed
gross monthly household income, adjusted for household size using the modiﬁed
OECD scale).
Analytical strategy
From our understanding of the literature on ethnic and political identity, these identities
are mutually implicated and constituted (Huddy 2001; Kenny 2014). Estimating models of
the eﬀect of ethnic identity on political identity or vice versa conceptualise one of these
identities causally aﬀecting the other directly and thus do not allow estimation and veriﬁ-
cation of the theoretical contention that common contextual factors (some of which
cannot be observed in their variation at the individual level) and unmeasurable individ-
ual-level characteristics (such as speciﬁc traits and orientations) inﬂuence the strength
of both political and ethnic identity simultaneously.
We, therefore, estimated political and ethnic identity as joint processes but allowing
their errors to be correlated using the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR), operationalised by the sureg command and implemented in Stata 14. By allowing
the errors to be correlated, we were able to estimate the existence and strength of common
unobserved contextual and individual factors based on the degree of correlation of the
error terms. As we include explanatory variables that may be associated with both
ethnic and political identities, the correlation of the error terms is net of these observed
terms. This method is thus not only the most appropriate but the only possible method
to allow us to properly answer our research question. This method additionally allows
diﬀerent sets of explanatory variables to be included in each model. We have assumed
that the error terms are not correlated with the explanatory variables across both equations
as this is needed for the identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst study to estimate the existence and strength of the (unmeasurable) co-evolution
process of political and ethnic identities.
We estimated these models separately for ethnic minority and majority groups. In sub-
sequent speciﬁcations, we also estimated these models separately for sub-groups split by
their party aﬃliations. We report the correlation coeﬃcient between the unobserved or
error terms of the two equations as an indicator of the degree to which ethnic and political
identities covary after controlling for observed factors expected to aﬀect both identities.
Clearly there will be other unobserved drivers of either political or ethnic identity, for
example, ecological commitment or cultural practices, but these are not necessarily corre-
lated with each other. Our interest is in the factors that plausibly drive both ethnic and
political identity and the extent to which these align with our theoretical expectations.
We estimated additional models including (a) Muslim religious aﬃliation, and (b) har-
assment. As the correlation of unobservables was almost identical for the model including
Muslim aﬃliation we do not report it separately. However, we do report the correlations
for the models with our two measures of harassment, as they were estimated on the
reduced sample of minorities only. The correlations are similar for ethnic minorities
across the two samples.
Given we know that identities vary with region of residence (Nandi and Platt 2016),
region could potentially inﬂuence political and ethnic identity in unmeasured ways.
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Failure to account for it would then bias upwards the correlation of the error terms. We,
therefore, estimated additional speciﬁcations including government oﬃce region. We
further investigated potential confounding at the local level and estimated another speciﬁ-
cation including small area (LSOA) deprivation. As the correlations of error terms were
almost identical in these speciﬁcations, we do not report these results.
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports weighted means and proportions of the variables used in this analysis, by
majority and minority group.
The diﬀerences between minorities and majority are in the expected directions. The sex
composition is quite similar, but minorities have a younger age composition, are less likely
to be retired, are more likely to be taking care of the family, are more likely to have a degree
qualiﬁcation, are less likely to be in a non-marital cohabitation, but are more likely to be
never married. These patterns are in line with recent evidence on the characteristics of UK
immigrants and the second generation (Dustmann, Frattini, and Theodoropoulos 2010;
ONS 2014). There is little diﬀerence in income and social class (NSSEC) proﬁles at the
aggregate level.
Ethnic identity is much stronger among ethnic minorities than the majority, as we
would expect. But by contrast with typical assumptions, as Figure 1 shows, net ethnic iden-
tity is nevertheless negative for minorities, indicating that other sources of identity (age or
life stage, gender, family, education, profession) are more salient. Net political identity is
weaker than other identities for both majority and minorities and is relatively similar
between the two.
Results
We ﬁrst investigate which observed characteristics are associated with stronger political
and ethnic identity, and whether these are the same for the majority and minority
groups. The estimated coeﬃcients from the political and ethnic identity models are
reported in Table 2. We illustrate certain key relationships in Figure 2. As anticipated,
women have weaker political identities than men. But while majority women have
weaker ethnic identity than majority men, as expected, ethnic minority women have stron-
ger ethnic identity than ethnic minority men. The diﬀerences in this association between
gender and ethnic identity are signiﬁcant across the models, consistent with claims that
women have stronger ethnic identities as the ‘carriers of culture’ (Winter 2016).
In line with earlier evidence, attaining a degree is associated with weaker ethnic identity.
But our expectation that higher levels of education would be associated with stronger pol-
itical identity is only found for the majority not for ethnic minorities. We speculate that,
given the high educational aspirations of ethnic minorities (Strand 2014), education may
provide an alternative not only to ethnic but also to political identity – a question beyond
the scope of this paper, but one which merits future scrutiny.
In terms of the local political context, the share UKIP/BNP in the local area is associated
with stronger ethnic (but not political) identities. Note that this is net of individual charac-
teristics and own party aﬃliation. This suggests that the political messaging around ethnic
ingroups and outgroups propagated in such environments may lead to the greater salience
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Table 1. Weighted estimates, by majority and minority groups.
White UK or majority Ethnic minority
Strength of Political Identity (Net) −0.93 −1.09
Strength of Ethnic Identity (Net) −0.71 −0.12
Proportion of valid votes cast for UKIP or BNP in 2010 General Election 0.05 0.04
Ethnic Group
white UK or majority 100%
Indian 25%
Pakistani 14%
Bangladeshi 5%
black Caribbean 10%
black African 13%
Mixed 12%
Other 21%
Sex
Men 44% 45%
Women 56% 55%
Age group
16–29 years 18% 33%
30–39 years 15% 27%
40–49 years 19% 21%
50–59 years 17% 10%
60+ years 30% 8%
Main activity status
Employed 56% 56%
Unemployed 5% 9%
Retired 25% 6%
Taking care of family 5% 11%
Full-time student 4% 14%
Ill or long term disability 4% 3%
Other 1% 1%
Highest educational qualiﬁcation
Degree 20% 34%
Other higher 12% 12%
A level or equivalent 20% 21%
GCSE or equivalent 27% 19%
Other qualiﬁcations 6% 3%
No qualiﬁcations 16% 11%
Household NSSEC (highest)
Higher 37% 41%
Intermediate 16% 17%
Lower 17% 20%
Other 30% 22%
Gross household monthly income
Income quintile, Lowest 21% 17%
Income quintile, 2nd 20% 19%
Income quintile, 3rd 20% 22%
Income quintile, 4th 20% 21%
Income quintile, Highest 19% 20%
Marital status
Never married 20% 35%
non-marital cohabitation 13% 5%
Married or civil partnership 52% 53%
Separated, divorced or widowed 15% 7%
Country of birth (generation)
Born outside UK 0% 63%
Born in UK 100% 37%
Party aﬃliation
Can’t Vote, None, Don’t Know 23% 27%
Conservative 29% 13%
Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green 44% 60%
Regional Parties 4% 0%
Region of residence
(Continued )
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of own ethnic identity – particularly for majorities, who may become more self-conscious
about an otherwise ‘latent’ sense of ethnic identity.
In relation to generation, the second generation reports stronger ethnic identity than
the ﬁrst generation, when controlling for other covariates. This is at ﬁrst challenging to
square with earlier evidence (e.g. Platt 2014), but the answer may lie in the nature of
Table 1. Continued.
White UK or majority Ethnic minority
London 8% 47%
Rest of England 75% 49%
Wales 5% 1%
Scotland 9% 2%
Northern Ireland 3% 1%
Egalitarian Score Category
Egalitarian Score> = 75th percentile 28% 21%
Egalitarian Score 25–75th percentiles 50% 46%
Egalitarian Score < 25th percentile 21% 33%
Religion
No religious aﬃliation 18% 6%
Christian-Protestant 68% 24%
Christian-Catholic 12% 12%
Muslim 0% 31%
Hindu 0% 15%
Sikh 0% 7%
Other 2% 6%
Number of observations 23,517 4,532
Figure 2. The association of selected individual and contextual characteristics with majority and min-
ority political identity.
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the measures. Typically, ethnic identity questions require identiﬁcation with a speciﬁc
identity (e.g. your mother’s/ father’s ethnic group) or a named identity (‘Pakistani’ ‘Car-
ibbean’ etc.). But our question did not prejudge the content of that identity – it leaves the
meaning of ‘ethnicity’ for the respondent to supply. Abundant research demonstrates that
identities are imbued with diﬀerent meanings for respondents (e.g. see the discussion in
Huddy 2001); hence, what respondents are envisaging when asked about their ‘ethnicity’
may be rather diﬀerent to when they are asked about the importance of being, say, Indian
Table 2. Estimated coeﬃcients of models of strength of (net) political and ethnic identity estimated
using SUR.
White UK or majority Ethnic minority
Strength of (net) Strength of (net)
Political
identity
Ethnic
identity
Political
identity
Ethnic
Identity
Sex (Ref: Men)
Women −0.24** −0.09** −0.18** 0.12**
Age group (Ref: 30–39 years)
16–29 years −0.13** −0.11** 0.02 0.12**
40–49 years 0.14** 0.11** 0.13** 0.06
50–59 years 0.21** 0.10** 0.18** 0.08
60+ years 0.35** 0.21** 0.19+ 0.12
Main activity status (Ref: Employed)
Unemployed 0.23** 0.09* 0.04 0.12*
Retired 0.48** 0.29** 0.21+ 0.21*
Taking care of family 0.33** 0.23** 0.16** 0.16**
Full-time student 0.09* −0.07+ −0.07 −0.03
Ill or long term disability 0.36** 0.24** 0.00 0.24**
Other 0.08 −0.01 0.20 0.26+
Highest educational qualiﬁcation (Ref: degree or higher)
Other higher −0.09** 0.06* −0.01 0.02
A level or equivalent −0.04+ 0.14** 0.04 0.09*
GCSE or equivalent −0.05* 0.16** 0.10* 0.19**
Other qualiﬁcations −0.04 0.22** 0.08 0.01
No qualiﬁcations −0.03 0.19** 0.21** 0.34**
Household NSSEC (Ref: Higher)
Intermediate −0.01 0.05* −0.07 0.05
Lower −0.06** 0.08** −0.16** −0.02
Other −0.05+ 0.05+ 0.07 0.05
Gross household monthly income (Ref: 4th)
Income quintile, Lowest 0.05* 0.00 0.06 0.02
Income quintile, 2nd 0.01 −0.04 0.01 0.02
Income quintile, 3rd 0.01 −0.02 0.05 0.01
Income quintile, Highest 0.03 0.02 −0.03 0.06
Marital status (Ref: Never married)
non-marital cohabitation −0.02 −0.04 0.21* 0.12
Married or civil partnership −0.09** −0.06* 0.08 0.07+
Separated, divorced or widowed −0.11** −0.02 0.1 0.25**
Country of birth (Ref: Born outside UK)
Born in UK 0 0 0.13** 0.10**
Proportion of Valid Votes cast for UKIP or BNP in 2010
General Election
−0.23 0.52* −0.41 0.54
Party Aﬃliation (Ref: Can’t Vote, None, Don’t Know)
Conservative 0.40** 0.06** 0.26** 0.00
Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green 0.44** −0.01 0.31** 0.11**
Regional Parties 0.38** 0.10* 0.08 −0.42*
Constant −1s.31** −0.99** −1.43** −0.62**
Number of observations 23,324 4,527
R-squared 0.134 0.055 0.049 0.055
Notes: Weighted estimates; +p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01.
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or Ghanaian. The second generation are acutely aware of and sensitised to their ‘ethnic
diﬀerence’ (Heath and Demireva 2014), without necessarily investing to the same extent
in the ethnicity speciﬁcally linked to their parental country of origin. Instead, they may
be reconceptualising their ethnic identity in ways that speak to more transnational orien-
tations (Muttarak 2014) or higher level groupings (Jacobson 1997). These ﬁndings provide
suggestive preliminary evidence for a form of reactive ethnicity (Rumbaut 1997) that has
not previously been found in UK studies. The second generation also expresses stronger
political identity than the immigrant generation, as we expected.
Turning to the posited relationship with the broader political context, political mobil-
isation by political parties and politicised discourses around ethnicity, we report the esti-
mated correlation coeﬃcients of the unobserved or errors terms from the two models
based on the weighted SUR models in Table 3. These estimated correlation coeﬃcients
for both majority and minorities are positive and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero (based on the Breusch–Pagan test of independence). These indicate that
there are common unmeasured factors associated with both ethnic and political identity.
We ﬁnd evidence that this correlation is stronger among the majority than among
ethnic minorities (0.33 compared to 0.18), in line with our expectations. As expected,
among majority members, we ﬁnd the correlation coeﬃcient for right-wing members,
who were argued to be more sensitive to the common political context, to be higher
than for other political-ethnic combinations (excepting regional parties). The correlation
coeﬃcient for majority members with aﬃliation to the Conservative party is 0.35 while it is
0.28 among majority members with aﬃliation to the Labour, Liberal Democrats or Green
parties.3
As regional parties have generally mobilised people on the basis of country-based iden-
tities, which would be interpreted by the respondents as their ethnic identity (Bechhofer
Table 3. Estimated correlation coeﬃcient of the (unobservables) error terms in the political and ethnic
identity models.
Entire sample Restricted sample for evaluation of harassment
All
White UK or majority 0.33**
ethnic minority 0.18** 0.20**
No party aﬃliation
White UK or majority 0.36**
ethnic minority 0.14** 0.16**
Conservative
White UK or majority 0.35**
ethnic minority 0.12** 0.13*
Labour, Liberal Democrats or Green
White UK or majority 0.28**
ethnic minority 0.22** 0.24**
Regional parties
White UK, parties 0.44**
High Egalitarian
White UK or majority 0.30**
ethnic minority 0.14** 0.13**
Low Egalitarian
White UK or majority 0.33**
ethnic minority 0.19** 0.22**
Number of observations 23,324 (white UK or majority)
4527 (ethnic minority)
2859 (ethnic minority)
Notes: weighted estimates; +p < 0.10 *p < .05 **p < .01 based on Breusch-Pagan test of independence of the residuals.
16 A. NANDI AND L. PLATT
and McCrone 2014), it follows that the correlation coeﬃcient for this group would also be
higher: 0.44.
In line with expectations, we also ﬁnd the correlation coeﬃcient for majority members
with no party aﬃliations to be high at 0.36, though we expected this would be because of
relatively low identiﬁcation on both measures. This is supported by the fact that the associ-
ation of political identity with party orientation among the majority is positive and signiﬁ-
cantly higher for all party aﬃliations as compared to those having no party aﬃliation (see
Table 2 and Figure 2).
Among ethnic minorities, not only is the correlation coeﬃcient of the underlying unob-
servables of ethnic and political identity models much lower (0.18), the correlations across
diﬀerent party aﬃliations show an opposite pattern to the majority (0.12 among the Con-
servatives and 0.22 among the Labour, Liberal Democrats or Greens).
We estimated separate models of political and ethnic identity for minorities including
religious aﬃliation as Muslim and experience of harassment. These estimated coeﬃcients
are reported in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 3. We argued that the politicisation of
Islam in political, popular – and also academic – discourse might have implications for
the identity patterns of Muslims in particular. Table 4 shows that there is no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the ethnic identity of Muslims and non-Muslims, but Muslims
report signiﬁcantly stronger political identity than non-Muslims. The increasing political
and social acceptability of anti-Muslim attitudes would appear to translate into a politici-
sation of those identities (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010).
When testing the contribution of ethnic and racial harassment we found no statistically
signiﬁcant support for an association between harassment and ethnic identity, in line with
other studies (e.g. Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014), though the point estimate is positive
(see Figure 3). The lack of a clear association is possibly because ethnic and racial harassment
is measured in the year before the interview, while ethnic identities develop over much
longer period. But we do ﬁnd that such an experience has a positive and signiﬁcant associ-
ation with political identity. The same relationship is observed for harassment for any
Table 4. Estimated coeﬃcients of models of strength of (net) political and ethnic identity estimated
using SUR.
White UK or majority Ethnic minority
Strength of (net) Strength of (net)
Political
identity
Ethnic
identity
Political
identity
Ethnic
identity
Base Model + Religion
Religious aﬃliation (Ref: Not Muslim)
Muslim 0.15 0.09 0.10** 0.03
Number of observations 23,324 4527
Base Model + Harassment
Harassment (Ref: None)
Physically or verbally attacked 0.16* −0.03
Felt unsafe or avoided places −0.04 0.01
Number of observations 2859
Base Model + Ethnic and racial harassment
Ethnic and racial harassment (Ref: none)
Physically or verbally attacked due to ethnicity, religion
or nationality
0.17* 0.08
Number of observations 2859
Notes: Weighted estimates; +p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01.
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reason. The fact that harassment is associated with political identity suggests that adverse
experiences can lead to reﬂection on the systems within which they are perpetuated.
Discussion
Ethnic identity is subject to increasing analysis and political debate in Western European
countries. Political claims about lack of minority endorsement of national identity have
been accompanied by a rise in populist conceptions of the nation, embedded in speciﬁc pol-
itical and cultural understandings of the past (Kenny 2014). But empirical evidence of this
co-evolution of political and ethnic identities is lacking. In this paper we investigated the
relationship between political and ethnic identity across ethnic minorities and majority
in the UK, using data from large, nationally representative survey, Understanding Society.
We showed, ﬁrst, that not only political identity but also ethnic identity was considered
less important than other identity domains. Second, we found largely similar associations
between observed characteristics and both political and ethnic identities for all. An excep-
tion was that majority group women had weaker ethnic identities than men while minority
women tended to have stronger ethnic identities than men. We also noted that the share of
the vote for BNP/UKIP was associated with stronger ethnic rather than political identiﬁ-
cation. This provided some initial support for the co-evolution of ethnic and political
identities.
Figure 3. The association of harassment and Muslim aﬃliation with minorities’ (net) ethnic and political
identities.
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We estimated the role of broader political mobilisation by political parties and politi-
cised discourses around ethnicity, by considering the extent to which unobserved determi-
nants of both ethnic and political identity were correlated. We found substantial and
statistically signiﬁcant correlations between the unobserved (unmeasured) factors that
inﬂuence both ethnic and political identiﬁcation, and that these were in line with the
theorised relationships. That is, the association was substantially greater for the ethnic
majority; and was larger among those majority members with more conservative/tra-
ditional orientations, devolved party aﬃliations and those with no party aﬃliation.
We also found that second-generation minorities tended to have stronger political and
ethnic identity than the ﬁrst generation. Rather than generational assimilation towards
greater political apathy (Heath et al. 2013) or ethnic identity decline, this suggests a
greater awareness and sensitivity to minoritised status that is not necessarily picked up
by standard measures. Martin and Mellon (2018) highlight the levels of political partisan-
ship among ethnic minority youth, which could be one part of the pathway to this greater
sensitivity.
Being Muslim and having experienced harassment were signiﬁcantly associated with
stronger political, but not ethnic, identity among minorities. Ethnic and racial harassment
was also associated with stronger political identity but not stronger ethnic identity.
Despite limitations to our analysis, namely that we assume we have captured all rel-
evant observables in our analyses, that we cannot make causal claims for the associations
between our covariates and our identity outcomes, and that we lack direct indicators of
political mobilisation that might allow us more thoroughly to test our proposed claims,
we nevertheless consider our paper makes a contribution to the literatures on ethnicity
and identity in the following ways.
We present the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, attempt to shed light on the relationship
between ethnic and political identity that does not presuppose the determination of one
by the other. We provide suggestive empirical evidence of the way ethnic and political
identity are jointly mobilised and respond to contextual factors that are by deﬁnition chal-
lenging to capture at the individual level.
Second, by using a ‘net’ measure of ethnic identity, we purged it of individual-level
tendencies to identify more or less strongly. This was important given the tendency
to identify more strongly among minorities. Having done this, we found that while politi-
cal identity was less salient across majorities and minorities than other identities, net
ethnic identity was also less salient, for minorities as well as for the majority. This indicates
that rather than being the most signiﬁcant aspect of identity across minorities, as much
ethnic identity research implicitly or explicitly suggests, minorities are (more) heavily
invested in other aspects of their identity. There is substantial scope to pay further atten-
tion to these diﬀerent identity ‘choices’, their drivers and implications (Huddy 2001).
Third, that we identiﬁed Muslim religious aﬃliation as associated with political but not
ethnic identity indicates not only the way the discourse around Islam is heavily politicised
and leads to political identiﬁcation. It also undermines the dominant discussion of
Muslims as heavily invested in ethnic identity and self-segregation from national processes
(Cameron 2011; DHCLG 2018).
Finally, against a backdrop of studies which have shown declining ethnic identity across
the generations, our ﬁndings lend tentative support to theories of ‘reactive ethnicity’
(Rumbaut 1997). That is, the salience of ethnic – as well as political – identity was
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greater in the second generation. This is in line with the theory that reaction to ‘assimila-
tive processes’ and greater sensitivity to group boundaries occurs as enduring ethnic
inequalities are realised. But it raises the question of why our results diﬀer from other
UK research that has investigated change in ethnic identiﬁcation across the generations
and come to the opposite conclusion. We noted that respondents were not asked about
a speciﬁc ‘pre-imposed’ identity but were able to interpret ethnic identity in their own
terms. We cannot, therefore, extrapolate what ‘ethnicity’ they had in mind when expres-
sing this identity, but it is consistent with a more expansive or transnational concept of
ethnicity than that constrained by speciﬁc categories (Muttarak 2014; Jacobson 1997).
Our ﬁndings indicate further lines of research. First, given the cross-national populist
currents and anti-immigrant sentiments in many countries, it would be of interest to
identify whether similar ﬁndings could be replicated in other contexts. Second, given
the dominance of other identity domains for both majority and minorities, it would be
worth interrogating how these themselves covary and are linked to stronger or weaker pat-
terns of social and political engagement. Our ﬁndings indicating reactive ethnicity also
merit further interrogation, with more direct intergenerational analysis and consideration
of the consequences for group relations.
Notes
1. Very few individuals (around 25) chose ‘white –Roma orGypsy Traveller’ as their ethnic group.
2. We explored alternative proxies for political orientation including (non)-traditional atti-
tudes, but retained this measure as closest to the construct we aimed to proxy.
3. An alternative measure using (in)egalitarian gender role attitudes to proxy traditionalism /
rightwing orientation produced comparable results (0.30 for high egalitarian, 0.33 for the rest).
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